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Discussant's Response to 
Auditing Implications Derived from a Review 
of Cases and Articles Related to Fraud 
Henry J. Murphy 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
I appreciate this opportunity to participate in the Fifth Annual Auditing Sym-
posium sponsored by The University of Kansas. Not only is it a personal honor 
but it will also be very helpful to me as a member of the A I C P A Standing Com-
mittee on Methods of Perpetration and Detection of Fraud. 
First of all, I want to compliment the authors on their study. I personally 
believe it was a study long overdue, and I can share their frustration in trying to 
"get to the facts and issues," so to speak, because our A I C P A Task Force has 
also been frustrated in trying to obtain similar information from various govern-
mental bodies, accounting firms, etc. The authors properly commented on this 
fact by stating that "many of the agencies and prisons responded they could not 
comply with our request" (for information) and went on to state that in their 
review of the 72 past cases of fraud, they attempted to determine the fraud-related 
variables which were present in each of the cases in order to establish a "red-flag'' 
checklist which could be helpful to auditors in detecting and deterring manage-
ment fraud. They further stated that in reviewing various articles, etc., it was 
most difficult to identify these variables because "certainly the authors who wrote 
about the cases probably had a perspective much different than ours.'' 
Problems Encountered 
I think the two aforementioned problems (or limiting factors, as the case may 
be) are extremely important for all of us who are interested in the subject to 
understand and be aware of in reaching any conclusions as to where we go from 
here, whether in terms of further research, using a "red-flag" approach in our 
auditing practice, or in the teaching environment. I will come back to these prob-
lems later but, in any event, I think the authors have done a good job of compiling 
some excellent research on a very complex issue. 
The authors comment on the fact that they used 72 past cases of fraud to 
validate the fraud-related variables and go on to compare the typical fraud 
perpetrator to incarcerated prisoners and to college students. However, I could 
not determine how the 72 cases were selected, nor did I understand why the com-
parison was made to college students as a control group. Further, I wasn't sure 
what college students were included; i.e., from a single university or a cross-




The authors state that there are four objectives to their interdisciplinary study 
and these need not be repeated here. I find the concept of an interdisciplinary 
study quite interesting from a research and teaching perspective, but become a lit-
tle concerned if this concept were contemplated by the authors to establish a 
similar team approach for conducting audits in the normal ongoing business envi-
ronment. M y reservation does not relate to the current practice of using or relying 
on other experts, which is covered under the existing auditing literature; rather, it 
deals with the authors' concept of developing "an early warning system that 
could be used by auditors in detecting and deterring fraud" which is the fourth 
objective spelled out by the authors. 
I believe that the existing literature (and court cases) now makes it clear that 
the external auditor has the responsibility to search for fraud which has a material 
impact on the financial statements presented. However, the authors' stated objec-
tive of developing a method (early warning system) which can be used by external 
auditors to deter fraud (material?/immaterial?) concerns me because I firmly 
believe that the responsibility for the deterrence of fraud rests clearly with 
management and the board of directors through the company's system of internal 
control. It is not practicable or cost efficient for the external auditors to be charged 
with this responsibility. However, an interdisciplinary approach by management 
in establishing the appropriate control environment and internal control systems, 
in the broadest sense of the word, is very helpful and is used by many companies 
in assessing hiring policies, establishing job criteria, selecting key personnel, etc. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The authors go on to state that they want to present some conclusions and im-
plications from the study and that two assumptions will be made (by the authors). 
First, they assume that the reader is familiar with auditors' responsibilities under 
existing SAS's and, second, that readers agree with their definition of manage-
ment fraud; i.e., improper actions resulting in a material misstatement of financial 
statements. 
Accordingly, the authors then state that "the remainder of the paper will be 
divided into three parts: 
1. A description or profile of the typical fraud perpetrator; 
2. A n explanation of why fraud occurs; and 
3. Steps that can be taken by auditors to reduce their exposure to 
management fraud." (See definition above.) 
In dealing with " T h e Typical Fraud Perpetrator," the authors have provided 
us with an extremely valuable insight but the problem is one which I previously 
mentioned; i.e., that they had to include embezzlers and (I believe) immaterial 
fraud perpetrators, and, accordingly, the characteristics of those who commit 
management fraud (by the authors' definition) could actually produce a different 
profile. This "identity problem" (of which ones committed management fraud 
vs. an embezzlement) could not, in my opinion, have been avoided for reasons 
upon which both the authors and I agree, and my comments are not meant as a 
criticism; rather, I mention it only to reinforce the fact that the problem does ex-
ist, and that as the accounting profession goes forward, we should do everything 
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possible to correct the situation by making available the necessary information to 
researchers on actual management fraud cases. 
Observations Concerning Cited Cases 
A t this time, I would like to go back to the point I made previously about the 
72 cases reviewed by the authors and their comments as they relate to the 
perspective of other authors on whose material they relied. The biggest surprises I 
had in reviewing the material presented (including the more extensive material to 
be published in book form which was made available to me by Dr. Albrecht) were: 
(1) there was no direct mention of the problem of collusion between employees 
against the company or between employees on behalf of the company, and (2) 
there was no reference to the accounting principles or reporting disclosures in-
volved in the "fraud" which have since been strengthened by new accounting 
pronouncements (such as profit recognition guidelines involving the sale of real 
estate) or by disclosure requirements (such as those involving related party trans-
actions). 
In other words, in many of these cases there was more than one person in-
volved but there was no mention of the interaction, of how this interaction was ad-
dressed, or how it possibly impacted the "profile" of a specific case or individual 
involved. 
Further, if the case involved a related party transaction (or a series of such 
transactions) including, say, the apparent sale of real estate and yet there were no 
definitive accounting or disclosures required under G A A P at the time, were these 
factors considered by the authors in reaching their conclusions? In other words, if 
there were no specific accounting and disclosure requirements and management 
made a choice (which may have been the wrong one, for whatever reasons), does 
this constitute management fraud, or is it poor judgment based on hindsight? If, 
for example, I were to commission a study of a particular case or series of cases and 
asked for an evaluation of the cases in light of the "state of the art", so to speak, 
as it relates to "principles" and "disclosures," what might the answer be? I can 
assure you that I don't know what it would be but I suspect that it might influence 
my conclusions. Please don't misunderstand my point. I am fully aware of the 
concept of "fairness" as to principles and disclosures (notwithstanding the state 
of the art) and if an expanded study were to address the "fairness'' issue, then that 
is perfectly acceptable to me. But let us not assume that because accusations have 
been made that it is axiomatic that there is guilt, because many of these cases were 
not tried in court; rather, they were settled via consent decrees. 
M y recollection of many of the cases reviewed by the authors was that the 
above-mentioned factors were key elements in many of these cases, and I would 
suggest that the authors' research be expanded and interrelated to the points I 
have mentioned. 
I have spent 20 years in public accounting and believe that there is no more 
difficult problem for auditors to deal with than the problem of collusion. A l l one 
has to do is consider the magnitude of "sensitive payment disclosures'' (over 400 
companies), price-fixing cases, and the purchasing agent/kickback scandal of 
earlier decades. I would think it would be of significant benefit to the profession if 
the authors could expand on this point as well as the impact of changed account-
ing principles and disclosure requirements. 
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In addition, I would like to see additional objective research on which of the 
72 cases involving management fraud (by the authors' definition) involved 
human (audit) failure; that is, if a careful review indicated that 20 of the 72 cases 
involved audit failure, would the conclusions reached by the authors have been 
the same or might they have differed? 
Deterrence of Fraud 
In reviewing the paper as it relates to "An Explanation of Fraud," I found it 
quite helpful and observed that it reinforced my earlier comment regarding who 
has the responsibility to deter fraud to note that the authors point out the social 
factors that contribute to the incidence of fraud, stating: 
Certainly it would be difficult for auditors to change many of these societal 
factors. Maybe a strong lobbying effort or high-placed connections would 
help but, generally, auditors must live with those factors. 
T h e Authors' Conclusions 
In summary, based on their research, the authors reached two conclusions. 
First, that it is imperative that auditors make fraud prevention an explicit part of 
their audit and, second, that they should take two steps to "reduce their exposure 
to fraud.'' The two steps which they suggest for auditors to take to reduce their 
exposure are to: (1) make sure they accept only "clean" clients, and (2) consider 
adopting a "red-flag'' checklist as part of their audit program. 
As to their first suggestion, I believe existing literature (SAS No. 16) clearly 
states that it is the responsibility of the auditor to plan and execute the audit in a 
manner which will uncover material irregularities or errors and, accordingly, I 
concur with the authors' conclusion if they are talking about material fraud. I 
might add that I believe it has always been an explicit part of the audit process via 
the use of audit programs, physical observations, counts, confirmations, etc. 
As to their second suggestion, I don't know of anyone who knowingly ac-
cepted a "dirty'' client, and the professional literature has been expanded to cover 
this point (SAS No. 7). However, in a more serious vein, their point is valid and 
really relates to the individual firm's quality control program and the monitoring 
thereof which lays down specific guidelines on the acceptance of new clients, in-
cluding the assignment of personnel who have the necessary industry knowledge. 
Our firm has had such criteria for many years and I'm sure that other firms have 
similar programs. 
However, their second suggestion causes me real concern for a couple of 
reasons. First, there is the implication that by coming up with a master checklist, 
it will solve the problem. I, and other members of the A I C P A Task Force, am 
constantly being asked (in substance) at various speaking engagements, "When 
are you going to give us a program or checklist which we can incorporate in our 
workpapers that will uncover fraud?" (and I might add they mean all fraud). M y 
response is that there will be no such program or checklist because there is no pro-
gram or checklist that could ever be developed to cover all situations. For exam-
ple, how would you apply a checklist to a multinational conglomerate with, say, 
25 operating subsidiaries around the world and having 200 or more operating 
plants or offices versus a local gas station under audit? The point is that the scope 
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of an audit is based on the auditor's knowledge of the risk involved, the adequacy 
of internal control, his knowledge of the industry, and his prior involvement with 
the clients in terms of results of prior years' audits. 
Furthermore, what if you couldn't get (for whatever reasons) objective 
answers to the questions involving the personal character issues concerning key 
management personnel? How many unanswered questions do you need before 
you must have a scope exception in your opinion or cite them in a "no material 
inadequacies" letter to regulatory authorities? Or, conversely, let's take a situa-
tion where a check on one of the key employees uncovers the fact that he is lack-
ing in certain moral standards (of your choice). The auditor has no power to hire 
or fire. (As an aside, let me assure you that, in practice, when a serious problem 
does exist, we have a way of communicating this information to the appropriate 
level of management in the company and have been doing this for years.) Further-
more, the implications of an auditor collecting personal information on manage-
ment have serious legal considerations which would need to be examined carefully 
and which could create serious auditor/client relationship problems that could 
have a direct bearing on completion of the audit and, accordingly, the cost thereof. 
T h e Red-Flag Checklist 
In summary, the incorporation of a standard "red-flag'' checklist in the stand-
ard audit process, in my opinion, has a number of serious limitations which have 
to be reviewed carefully as to their long-term implications before any such 
checklist is adopted as a "standard'' audit procedure. 
Does this mean that the proposed checklist is without merit? No, it does not. 
Rather, I think it should be directed at the training effort of the individual firms 
and made part of either basic or advanced accounting curriculum at the university 
level. I think back to my early days with Arthur Andersen 6k Co. and the content 
of our training, both in a formal classroom sense and the informal "on-the-job" 
training. This training covered not only general audit principles but also included 
a great deal of emphasis on specific industries (i.e., banking, brokerage, real estate, 
etc.). The training was aimed at dealing with "risk'', not only "risk' ' as it relates 
to general audit problems but also in "people" auditing. The problem of "high-
flying" management, "personal situation pressures", and other pressures men-
tioned by the authors is something that I believe is currently being discussed but 
the importance of which needs to be reconfirmed constantly not only via increased 
training but also through additional research in the entire area of fraud and fraud 
detection and deterrence. 
In fact, the idea of a "red-flag" checklist was so attractive as a training tool 
that, as you are aware, the A I C P A Task Force, on which I serve, published such a 
list in 1979 because we believed it would be helpful to the accounting profession 
in the context discussed in the previous paragraph, so I am totally in support of the 
authors' approach. 
Another concept I would like to see addressed is the concept of "greed." 
Webster's definition follows: 
Excessive desire for getting or having, especially wealth; desire for more 
than one needs or deserves; avarice; cupidity. 
I believe that this concept should be incorporated into a research study dealing 
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with the many issues raised by the authors. "Greed'' is a dirty word, so to speak, 
but it also seems that it is an attribute applicable to a segment of our population. 
The authors' concept of what constitutes "management fraud" could be a very 
interesting study. Consider the possibilities. Let's assume M r . or Ms. X is highly 
motivated and ambitious and that he/she is in a position of power. Further, 
assume that our business person comes from an overachieving background, has 
access to competent professional advice of all kinds and wants to "get ahead" as 
fast as possible. Further, assume that this person is very persuasive with a positive 
outlook as to the outcome of current developments, contracts, the economy, etc. 
This description of an individual and the situation is quite common in our free 
enterprise system and rightfully so. The manager is trying to put his/her best foot 
forward but, if there is a certain change in circumstances, he/she could be accused 
of being "greedy" or committing "management fraud" because the decision 
path he/she followed was aggressive, positive, and to his/her best interest because 
of compensation agreements; or, on the other hand, was he/she just being an ag-
gressive manager? Conversely, another individual will sometimes construct the 
worst possible scenario in the worst possible situation and try to convert it into a 
"positive growth" situation. This to me creates the real difference as to what is 
reasonable versus what is unrealistic. This is what the auditor has to learn to con-
tend with and dissect and where he must use judgment and experience to reach 
his conclusions. 
Other Comments 
There are two other points which I feel should be made. The first deals with 
the number of audits which are done each year and the incidence of management 
fraud therein. The second is the composition of the audit team. 
I do not know how many audit reports are issued each year but the number 
has to be in the hundreds of thousands, and while even one case of management 
fraud would be a sad commentary, I think we have to accept the fact that there are 
people who, for the reasons suggested by the authors, will commit fraud (of all 
types). But it seems to me that the incidence of management fraud is relatively 
small and, in fact, could be infinitesimally small in relation to the number of audits 
involved. Obviously, the problem of irregularities, embezzlements, etc., is a much 
larger problem from the standpoint of incidence and must not be ignored. Ac-
cordingly, as the teaching profession and we in public practice constantly em-
phasize the importance of the adequacy of internal controls, I pray that we not 
develop a generation of professionals who conceive that "everyone is a crook until 
proven otherwise." Rather, we must develop a generation who will maintain an 
attitude of "professional skepticism." We must remember that the majority of 
clients we represent (both in the public and private sector) are seeking the same 
goals we are and operate totally within the existing legal and moral framework 
throughout their business careers. 
M y final point. In general, each audit team is made up of people at various ex-
perience levels, starting with the partner who has the most experience. Most audit 
partners whom I have talked to (and not just from my own firm) have the healthy 
skepticism I referred to. They may call it " a gut feeling" based on their experi-
ence and industry expertise, but the fact is that they maintain an alertness to the 
"red flags'' identified by the authors and they do not hesitate to expand the audit 
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scope as the situation requires. This, I recognize, is a very subjective area but 1 
think we must acknowledge that auditing is a combination of art and sciences. 
While there may be cases of human audit failure, I think it would be misleading to 
assume that management fraud hasn't been detected and stopped in its infancy on 
many occasions. The problem is that the "success stories" never make the 
newspapers or the courts, while the "bad news'' makes the headlines. 
To illustrate this point, I would like to relate a true story involving an audit I 
was involved in as a young staffman in the early '60s. As you will recall, there 
were at that time very few authoritative pronouncements on accounting principles 
and fewer on disclosure. In fact, it was considered unique if there were footnotes to 
the financials. In any event, the problem we faced was disclosure to owners and 
creditors of a number of significant changes in this situation which had occurred 
in the company during the year. The changes included (among other things) a 
change in top management, a change in marketing strategy and financing of 
customers, a change in production arrangements for their only product line which 
resulted in decreasing profit margins on production, a change in banking relation-
ships, a turnover of key personnel, a change of law firms, and a proposed change of 
manufacturing locations. In substance, the company had radically changed 
although they were still selling the same product, in the same market, with the 
same labor force, and in the same economy. 
It was our opinion that the facts had to be clearly spelled out in the proxy state-
ment, as well as in footnotes to the financial statements, including the fact that 
there were related party transactions involving the new management who had in-
troduced other related party transactions which, I might add, made some business 
sense. A l l of these changes resulted in a series of meetings which culminated in a 
heated discussion over the phone between a partner from our firm (who is long 
since retired) and counsel for the company. I was fortunate to be included in the 
discussion via a conference call as an observer, so to speak. After much bickering, 
I recall, as if it were yesterday, the partner asking counsel if they were aware of the 
implications of Rule 10 b.5 of the SEC and that he didn't care if there wasn't a 
specific requirement to disclose certain transactions or accounting practices; 
rather, he was interested in a fair presentation and fair disclosure. As a result, the 
accounting policies which we felt necessary were disclosed. 
You may ask what is the point of this story. M y response is that an auditor 
can't rely on a checklist approach because circumstances differ; rather, he must 
also exercise judgment which is a far more critical attribute in any audit. 
An Educational Plea 
I would also like to make a plea to the colleges and universities who are offer-
ing degrees in accounting. I recommend that material such as that developed by 
the authors, as well as other recently-published material, such as Management 
Fraud by Robert Elliott and John Willingham, be incorporated into existing or 
newly-created auditing courses. I believe the public accounting profession has 
become much more cognizant of the problem of management fraud and has made 
internal changes in various degrees to deal with the problem. Hopefully, your pro-
fession can say the same and lead all of us in doing the necessary research to help 
solve the problem. 
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